Since the hack incident is now resolved and the network is fully available and stable for use, the Transition RAC as decided to end the Discussion phase at 23:59 UTC, Friday 18th Sep 2026, and proceed to the next phase.
@Daffy maybe one last thing:
A suggestion before the phase closes: two-stage as the standing default for RAC and Treasury Signer elections
The Registry/Framework conflict over who selects the election method is already fixed — thank you, that was the right call. This is about the default that now stands unopposed.
Majority Judgment is a good general default. It is simple, it scales, and for most elections it makes the right trade. My concern is narrow and applies to two bodies only.
Under MJ, every seat on a body is decided in the same single ballot by the same electorate. Reading the Election Methods Guide (Principle 4) alongside the quorum floors, a group voting as a bloc could take every seat on a body at roughly 4.2% of eligible supply — and delegation is disabled for these elections, so there is no participation floor to lean on. If my arithmetic is off I would genuinely like to be corrected, but the structural point holds whatever the exact figure is: MJ offers no seat-by-seat resistance. It is all-or-nothing by construction.
For most roles that trade is fine. For two, I don’t think it is:
- the RAC, because it is the oversight body — the thing meant to catch capture elsewhere;
- the Treasury Signers, because they hold the money.
These are the two seats where capture resistance should outrank simplicity, and the two where a clean sweep does the most damage — because afterwards there is no minority left inside the body to raise an objection.
Suggestion: keep Majority Judgment as the standing default, and make two-stage the standing default specifically for RAC and Treasury Signer elections. Two rounds make a single coordinated sweep substantially harder, at very little process cost — these are among the least frequent elections the DAO runs.
To be clear, this is a suggestion and not an objection. I have read the full ratification set and found nothing that would make me vote against GP-PRE-1; I intend to support it either way. I would simply rather raise this while the phase is still open.
Hey!
I have to admit that I didn’t manage to work through the whole policy library yet. It’s a lot of work! Since the discussion window is closing, I am posting what I found out so far. I am not an expert on any of this so take my suggestions with a grain of salt.
General
“Short” Temperature Checks
Temperature Check Voting Period (Short) is set as “>= 1 day”
At 1 day, the vote outcome will be severely influenced by voter availabilty. Some voters may not get a reasonable chance to participate. I think the “standard” 5-day minimum window is about as low as we can go here.
Therefore, I think the “short” TC period should be abolished entirely. We need to either accept higher latency or come up with procedures that avoid the need for an extra vote.
PDF vs Markdown
Drafting policies as Markdown but converting to PDF for the official vote adds an extra verification step for voters: we need to check if the PDF is the same text as the .md we have been reviewing. I would prefer to vote on SHA256sums of the .md files rather than SHA256sums of the PDFs.
It’s probably not worth delaying the ratification over this though.
Single source of truth / Don’t repeat yourself
I believe we should aim towards having a “single source of truth” for most rules, most of the time.
Currently, there are some sections that restate rules from other documents.
The “Don’t repeat yourself” principle from software development should be applied to these policies for pretty much the same reasons as in software: Repititions make the library harder to maintain and introduce a risk of divergence now or in future updates.
I point out some instances of this below.
“Relationship to Other Policies” sections
The “Relationship to Other Policies” at the end of many policies is an instance of this. It will be very easy for us to forget updating these with every change to any policy.
We should move all of these sections to non-authoritative documents.
Separation of authoritative documents from guides and comments
We should move all non-authoritative documents into a separate folder, i.e. a “guides” folder next to “governance”, “constitutional”, etc.
This would make it easier to distinguish between policies and guides.
Charter and OA
Charter §4A.2A “Ratification precedes the Company”
The ratification process might take longer than founding the company. So the ratification might not actually precede the founding of the Company? I hope we are not in a race against MIDAO right now.
Charter: “Delegates” vs “RAC Members”
The charter sometimes uses “Delegates” where “RAC members” would be appropriate instead.
RAC Members don’t necessarily hold a Delegated Function at all times.
Hence there might at least occasionally be RAC Members who are not Delegates.
I believe these RAC members should not be excluded from the following provisions:
- Charter §12.2 “Emergency Amendments”: “unanimous written consent of all Delegates”
- Charter §14 “Notices and Service”: “must be forwarded to the Delegates”
=> Change “Delegates” to “RAC members” here. - There may be other instances of this I missed.
Charter: Lack of Double Entrenchment
Charter §12.1 “Entrenched Provisions” does not designate itself as Entrenched.
Neither does the OA designate it as Entrenched.
If these are intended to be set in stone, Charter §12.1 needs to be modified and OA §12.2a needs to explicitly designate Charter §12.1 as “Entrenched” (the latter is needed due to OA §12.2.a.viii).
My current understanding of the Entrenchment rules
-
OA-level entrenched provisions may be changed according to the following rules:
- Must meet “quorum threshold for Entrenched Provision amendments specified in the Charter”
- this must be >= 2x “ordinary” governance quorum threshold
- 2/3 approval (66.67%)
- if RAC itself is affected, RAC consent is required
- Disclosure via “Official Venue” >=21d before vote opens
- Must meet “quorum threshold for Entrenched Provision amendments specified in the Charter”
-
Charter-level entrenched provisions may not be changed at all.
However, a standard Constitutional level proposal might be able to repeal this rule since Charter §12.1 is not itself Entrenched:
- 10% quorum (minimum 7% quorum enforced by Charter/12.1.2 which is OA-level entrenched)
- 66.00% approval according to Parameters Registry (0.67% less than OA-level? Why?)
My confusion
I don’t understand the intent behind the distinction between Charter-level and OA-level entrenchment.
Which rules are supposed to be entrenched to which degree?
Is the Charter-level entrenchment supposed to “super-entrench” a subset of OA-level entrenched provisions so that this specific subset can’t be changed no matter what?
OA §12.2.d.i “Ordinary quorum threshold” not clearly defined
OA §12.2.d.i states that amending an Entrenched Provision requires “participation by holders of not less than the quorum threshold for Entrenched Provision amendments specified in the Charter, which shall be not less than twice the ordinary quorum threshold for governance decisions”
“ordinary quorum threshold for governance decisions” is not well-defined.
The DAO Parameters Registry defines three proposal types that may be interpreted as “ordinary”.
I suspect the “Executable” proposal type was intended here. Otherwise the 2x “ordinary” threshold would already exceed the Constitutional current quorum threshold.
=> In the Parameters Registry, declare that the “Executable” threshold is intended to be the “ordinary quorum threshold for governance decisions” specified in the OA.
Charter §13 Scope
In the OA, “Charter” is taken to include the entire policy library.
In the Governance Framework, “Charter” is just the charter.md itself.
This is quite confusing but presumably can’t easily be changed. So we should pay attention to precise phrasing to minimize the confusion:
The boldfaced inline heading “The policy library forms part of this Charter.” in §13 fails to make this distinction. Change it to something like "Scope of ‘Charter’ in the Operating Agreement: "
I also think we should add a note to the Charter Reading Guide, perhaps at the end of the “How to read the Charter” section:
- Note that in the Operating Agreement, ‘Charter’ is understood to include the entire policy library in addition to the Charter itself.
Other policies
Dispute Resolution & Arbitration Policy §7
“Valid Grounds for Refusal” should not be redefined here. The “Treasury Signers Operational Rules” should be the single source of truth for that. I think the entire section “Valid Grounds for Refusal” should be removed without replacement.
Elections: Electability floor “Good”
If “Good” is the minimum passing grade and we use a 60% quantile threshold, voting “Acceptable” always has the same effect as voting “Poor”.
Hence, the distinction between “Acceptable” and “Poor” is not needed.
Maybe we should make “Acceptable” the minimum passing grade instead?
Proposal & Voting Framework §3.2: Stage 2 — Temperature Check (TC)
Section “The Temperature Check in an Election proposal”
A failed Temperature Check is terminal for that election: no election vote opens, no seats are filled, and the standard 7-day cooldown (DAO Parameters §3.4) runs before a new Temperature Check may be submitted for the same role.
If an election TC blocks other election TCs for the same role for 7 days, it may be possible to DoS the election process by proposing a bullshit candidate list as soon as the 7-day cooldown runs out.
Section “Temperature Checks used outside this pipeline”
Violates “single source of truth” principle: Other uses of TCs don’t belong here. Just mention that there are other uses for TCs but don’t enumerate them.
Proposal & Voting Framework §6.2.3 [Retired — Weighted Allocation]
There is no reason to keep around text that is not used anywhere.
Just replace the entire content of the section with “[Omitted]” to keep the section numbering intact.
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Hey @StokDokulus & @Daffy,
thanks for your valued input. Good findings!
I analyzed your findings and that inspired me to do further checks.
I’ve structured them a bit more clearly, including suggestions and explanations (where possible or appropriate).
Five structural points, ordered by what I think could bite later
I have read (with the help oy my clanker) the Charter for places where the rules could deadlock, contradict each other, or be turned against the DAO by someone acting in bad faith. Not drafting nits. Everything below is checked against RadixDAO/governance-framework @ 14a0510, and several build on StokDokulus post above.
Two things up front, so this is read in the right spirit.
First, most of what I looked for is not there. The obvious self-entrenchment routes are closed, and closed deliberately. An incumbent cannot sit on a seat by simply never calling an election — §9.5 caps auto-renewal at 4 consecutive terms and calls itself “the load-bearing safeguard against indefinite incumbency”. A RAC that fails to publish its route does not empty the body either: §9.2’s holdover rule exists precisely so “an administrative failure by the RAC cannot by itself drop seated membership below the floor”. A failed Activation Vote re-runs, and the Transition RAC’s initiation duty is expressly “non-discretionary”. The emergency suspension power is time-bounded rather than open-ended. Continuity §4.1 has tiered fallbacks down to a single surviving member. That is better than most governance frameworks out there. Great work!
Second, two of the five points below are Operating Agreement matters, not part of the 21 ratified documents. I am raising them here anyway because the OA is executed at formation — expected within days — and that is the last moment at which adding a sub-clause costs nothing. After that, changing it is an Entrenched-Provision amendment.
I support ratification. None of this is a reason to vote NO.
1. Nothing in the Charter is actually unamendable — including the rule that protects every vote
Charter §12.1 opens:
“the following provisions may not be amended, reduced, or removed by any governance proposal, regardless of approval level”
Two paragraphs earlier, §12 says the opposite:
“Where a proposed amendment to this Charter would amend, or take effect as an amendment to, a provision that is an Entrenched Provision … it may be made only in accordance with the elevated Entrenched-Provision amendment thresholds in Operating Agreement §12.2(c) … or §12.2(d)”
And OA §12.2(d) confirms it: after Activation an Entrenched Provision “may be amended” at 20% quorum and two-thirds. The OA prevails over the Charter (OA §11.3; Charter §13). The absolute prohibitions in OA §12.2(b) apply “during the Transition Period” only.
So after Activation there is no absolutely entrenched provision anywhere in the framework. “Regardless of approval level” means “at 20% and two-thirds”.
For three of the four items that is survivable. Non-distribution and the asset lock have an external backstop — Marshall Islands non-profit law and the Certificate of Formation, preserved by OA §12.2(e). The quorum floor and the voting-source floor are separately named in OA §12.2(a)(ix)–(x), so they survive even if Charter §12.1 is edited.
Item 3 has neither. The governance sovereignty constraint — “no governance proposal may grant any body or person unilateral authority to override a valid DAO vote outcome” — appears nowhere in the OA’s own list. I searched it; the only comparable language is §8.3, which is about the Activation Date specifically. Item 3 reaches Entrenched status only through the catch-all in OA §12.2(a)(viii), and that clause carries this proviso:
“provided that no such Charter designation shall itself have the status of an Entrenched Provision unless so specified in this Agreement.”
So the designation that protects item 3 is itself not protected. The rule that stops any body from being handed override power over the community depends on one sentence in an un-entrenched list.
Two suggestions, and the first is the one that matters:
- Add the governance sovereignty constraint to the OA as §12.2(a)(xi), in the same form as (ix) and (x). Those two show the pattern already exists and is uncontroversial. This has to happen before the OA is executed.
- In Charter §12.1, replace “regardless of approval level” with an accurate statement — that these provisions may be amended only under OA §12.2(c)/(d), and are absolutely prohibited from amendment only during the Transition Period under §12.2(b). As written, §12.1 tells readers they are permanent. A community that believes a rule is untouchable will not watch for attempts to touch it.
2. The emergency amendment power gives an appointed person a veto
Charter §12.2 lets the Charter itself be temporarily amended by “unanimous written consent of all Delegates”.
Unanimity means every Delegate holds a veto over the DAO’s only fast-repair mechanism. Two things make that worse than it first looks.
Who counts as a Delegate is not the RAC. DAO Parameters §6B allows two Delegates who are not seated RAC members — the holder of an elected seat, and an interim Treasury Signer appointed from the Emergency Signer Reserve. The second is appointed, not elected. Under §12.2 as drafted, that person holds a veto over emergency amendments to the constitution.
It also contradicts what Delegates are for. Delegate Mandate §1:
“They are execution agents, not decision-makers: their authority is limited to carrying out validly authorized decisions.”
Amending the Charter is not carrying out a decision.
The Charter already solves this for the Transition Period, where §12.2 reads the phrase as “all seated Transition RAC members”. The gap is post-Activation only.
Suggestion: in §12.2, change “all Delegates” to “all seated RAC members”, matching the Transition-Period reading already in the same section. In §14, “forwarded to the Delegates” reads better as “forwarded to the RAC”, with Compliance Operations Policy §5 still carrying the detail.
3. Only the RAC can consent to fixing the rules for removing the RAC
OA §12.2(d)(iii) requires, for any amendment affecting
“the constitutional role, composition, election mechanics, or removal procedure of the Permanent RAC”
the prior written consent of the Permanent RAC — two-thirds of seated members, per DAO Parameters §3A.4.
Removing an individual RAC member is unaffected: that runs under Elections & Role Governance §10 as an ordinary Governance Process proposal, and the RAC does not get a veto on it. That is the right design and it limits the damage considerably.
What cannot be done without RAC consent is changing the removal procedure itself. If that procedure turns out to have a defect — a threshold that cannot be met, a step only the RAC can initiate, an interaction nobody foresaw — the only body that can agree to repair it is the body it governs. A RAC benefiting from the defect has no reason to consent, and the community has no route around it.
This is a narrow catch-22, not an open door. But it is the kind of thing that is invisible until it matters, and then unfixable.
Suggestion: carve the removal procedure out of §12.2(d)(iii), so RAC consent is required for role, composition and election mechanics but not for the rules governing its own removal. If that is felt to be too weak a protection against a hostile amendment, a higher community threshold for that carve-out would achieve the same protection without making the RAC judge in its own cause. Like point 1, this needs to happen before the OA is executed.
4. A single bloc can take an entire body in one ballot
Under Majority Judgment every seat on a body is decided in one ballot by one electorate. Reading the Election Methods Guide alongside the quorum floors, a bloc voting together could take every seat at roughly 4.2% of eligible supply — and delegation is disabled for these votes, so there is no participation floor to rely on. If my arithmetic is off I would like to be corrected, but the structure does not depend on the figure: MJ offers no seat-by-seat resistance. It is all-or-nothing by construction.
For most roles that is a fair trade for simplicity. For two it is not:
- the RAC, because it is the body meant to catch capture everywhere else;
- the Treasury Signers, because they hold the money.
A clean sweep is worst precisely there, because afterwards no minority remains inside the body to object — and, per point 3, a swept RAC can then withhold consent to any amendment of its own removal procedure. The two points compound.
Suggestion: keep Majority Judgment as the standing default, and make two-stage the standing default for RAC and Treasury Signer elections only. Two-stage is the one point in the framework where a sufficiently large minority can decline a candidate outright. These are among the least frequent elections the DAO runs, so the extra round costs very little.
5. Dispute §7 hands an obstructive signer an argument
Treasury Signers Rules §9 defines when a signer may refuse to execute, and the list is closed: “Treasury Signers may refuse or delay execution only when:” followed by five grounds.
Dispute Resolution §7 restates it and opens it: “A signer may refuse execution on the grounds defined in Treasury Signers Rules §9, including:” followed by three — which are paraphrases, not quotations. “The proposal text is inconsistent or ambiguous” does not appear in §9. It then says refusal “on grounds outside this list” is Selective Obstruction, without making clear whether “this list” means its own three or §9’s five.
A signer refusing in good faith is unaffected. A signer refusing in bad faith now has a textual argument that the grounds are open-ended, and a second argument that whichever list is used, it was not “outside” it. Since a refusal to sign is how a payment gets blocked, an arguable refusal is a real delay, and Selective Obstruction becomes harder to establish precisely when it is needed.
Suggestion: delete the “Valid Grounds for Refusal” heading and its three bullets, replacing them with one sentence: “Valid grounds for refusal are those set out in Treasury Signers Rules §9, which is the exhaustive list. Refusal on any other ground is a Selective Obstruction matter under §9A.” The Process subsection below it is unaffected. One source of truth, one list, no second reading.
Points 1 and 3 are the time-critical ones, because they are OA text and the OA gets signed at formation. Points 2, 4 and 5 sit inside the ratified documents and can follow the normal route.
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I unfortunately know this debate a little too well as I battled over it for a couple of days.
The thing is that timing won. The sometimes stronger alternative simply takes forever to execute.
The guide was wrong as it did not capture the changes we did to the MJ using Grade Quantile with settings raising the bar to the same level as for the two step threshold level.
From a Clanker to another:
Thank you — this is the most useful comment we’ve had, and your arithmetic is right. One part of it is our fault.
The guide needs an update. You cited Principle 4 correctly; it’s our current text. But it lists Treasury Signers as a case for two-stage without saying they aren’t ordinarily elected — they’re allocated by the RAC from among its seated members and run with the holder’s RAC seat (P&V §4.5; Delegate Mandate §3). So half the suggestion has nothing to attach to, and the guide led you there. We’re fixing it. It also means the two concerns aren’t separate fronts: capturing Treasury Signing runs through the RAC seat.
The threshold argument was answered by the Grade Quantile. MJ originally settled grades at the median — half of turnout, ~3.5% of eligible. Moving the crossing to three-fifths made it the same share as the two-stage Stage 2 gate, deliberately: Parameters §6B states that both mechanisms now put the same share-of-turnout test to a candidate. A bloc needs 60% either way, so two rounds aren’t harder as a threshold matter.
Three mechanics lock that in: the quantile is not a parameter (fixed in §6.2.4, not selectable per election, changing it amends the counting mechanics); the Minimum Qualifying Grade was held at Good rather than lowered to Acceptable when the quantile rose; and reruns run at the same quorum, quantile and floor — more time, not a lower bar. The mechanism also isn’t the administering body’s to pick; only the DAO can depart from the default.
Your scope point survives and we agree with it — one ballot, one snapshot, the whole body. But two-stage doesn’t defeat the bloc you describe either: at 60% of turnout it tops the Stage 1 ranking and clears the 60% gate on each candidate. What it adds is that the bloc must sustain 60% across several votes with separate snapshots. Real friction, not a threshold barrier. Note the quantile cuts your way too: more than two-fifths of turnout can hold the whole field below the floor, and a quorate round seating nobody is a valid result, not a failure.
Execution time drives the default. A default governs every election, and most are replacements against a clock. MJ is one round. Two-stage is Stage 1, Stage 2, per-candidate reruns, then fallback advancement — each a separate vote, with reruns waiting on all concurrent Stage 2 votes. Against the 21-day Replacement Completion Time that matters, and an unfilled oversight seat is its own risk. Your case is strongest for a founding election, where the gap between rounds is where a shortlist gets scrutinised — which argues for choosing two-stage for a given election, not for making it the standing default.
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And please don’t make this into a Clanker competition. I am starting to observe feedback that is not presice and it looks dead serious but are having no real implications in a real world DAO operations.
All feedback so far is try to break the logical text structure while there has been little to none feedback on the Parameters settings. Which in my view is far more important,
Please try to do a bit more work on the importance and business risk on the findings before you post the large amounts of findings that just ruin my weekend.
On the positive side: the text you post is very descriptive.
“finished being grumpy”
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I don’t know if this was directed at me too. But FWIW I did not use clankers at all, which is why I couldn’t review all of the policies yet. I made some “breaking the logical text structure”-type suggestions because I believe they may actually have an impact.
The tight deadline posted by @projectShift prompted me to post a draft which maybe looks somewhat AI-generated but isn’t.
Regarding the Parameters, my most important feedback is the part on the “Short” TC which I believe is way too short. 1 day just isn’t enough for a meaningful vote. I think this will lead to complaints when some folks just can’t vote on some of these.
I know you are reading. And you are among the few. And it is appreciated. I had other plans for the weekend and got a bit pissed that it was almost silence for 3 weeks and when a date finally emerged suddenly a lot of stuff landing on the table.
Let me answer your questions around short TC period.. (And I need help from AI to help me write proper language): In short. The minimum <1 day TC is only for Election process activated by the RAC. Not for anything else. The laternative sitting and waiting 5 days + for accepting or rejecting a known candidate list is waste of time.
#1 Short TC. The reviewer treats the election TC as a standalone vote dropped on an unprepared electorate. It isn’t. It is preceded by the 7–10 day Election Nomination & Discussion Window ([Parameters §3.1] during which the candidate list is built in public; the TC and the election vote are created in one platform operation over a list immutable from creation ([P&V §3.2]).
By the time the TC opens the community has had up to ten days’ notice. It is a list-level gate at 3% quorum, not a substantive decision — and ≥1 day is a floor, not an instruction. A RAC running a founding election will obviously run it longer. This is exactly the “humans will exercise judgment” point. Abolishing it also adds five days to every tie runoff ([Elections §7A.4]), which uses the short period by design. Net effect of their proposal: slower founding RAC seating, which gates activation, for no integrity gain.
Let me address you other points in a separate post.
The evaluation of your points are: (AI Assisted)
Three things you raised are being fixed before the vote, and one of them led us to a defect nobody had spotted.
Adopted and committed to the repo.
“Delegates” vs “RAC members”* — you were right, and it was worse in the other direction too: an elected Delegate holding no RAC seat would have held a veto over emergency Charter amendments. Charter §12.2 now reads “all seated RAC members”, and §14 covers Delegates and RAC members, with Compliance Operations §5 conformed to match.
Dispute Resolution §7 — agreed. The restated refusal grounds are gone; Treasury Signers Rules §9 is now the single authority.
Dispute Resolution §9* (found while checking your §7 point) — allegations against a RAC member were routed to a Working Group not constituted at launch. They now go to Level 4.
Not changing, briefly explained
Short TC — ≥1 day is a floor, not a mandate, and it follows a 7–10 day Nomination & Discussion Window. It also carries tie runoffs, which would slow materially.
PDF vs Markdown — the signature is what binds a document to the Transition RAC. Hashing the .md gives integrity but no authenticity.
DRY / “Relationship to Other Policies” / guides folder — we audited all eight of those sections: two contain operative rules, including the library’s only conflict-of-laws provision. A blanket move would have deleted rules. Guides are already excluded from the ratified manifest and labelled non-authoritative.
§4A.2A — ratification preceding formation is the design, not an accident; OA §1.11 and §11.1A exist specifically for a pre-formation vote.
“Ordinary quorum threshold” — Parameters §3A.4 already fixes it at 20%, being twice the Constitutional quorum. That satisfies the OA floor on every reading of “ordinary”, so nothing turns on the ambiguity. Pegging it to Executable would lower the entrenchment bar from 20% to 10%.
Charter §13 heading — the OA defines “Charter” broadly itself (§1.8) and refers to the Elections Policy “forming part” of it (§1.19, Schedule 5 condition 7).
Electability floor — your arithmetic is right: at the current floor, Acceptable and Poor coincide. The scale keeps headroom if the floor ever moves, and moving it to Acceptable would lower the bar for the founding RAC — a policy choice rather than a cleanup.
Election TC as a DoS vector — a third party can’t submit one. The TC and the election vote are created together by the RAC over a list fixed at creation.
§6.2.3 — not dead text. It routes multi-recipient Treasury proposals to the Standard vote type.
On entrenchment
The two layers aren’t degrees of the same thing — Charter §12.1 binds the community’s constitutional order, OA §12.2 binds the Company in law. That’s why OA §12.2(a)(viii) provides that a Charter designation carries no OA-level status unless the OA says so, and (ix)–(x) then name the two that do.
Which designations sit at which layer was a deliberate drafting decision by legal counsel, not an omission. Charter §12.1 is not self-designating for the same reason. We’re not reopening it.
If you want further explanation on any of the topics or strongly disagree in the analysis please respond in which area this is and I will provide more background information.
A reply to Dazlights additional investigation:
Please be careful on investigating others findings where you treat all of them as good findings.
That’s not always the case.
The status on the case you brought up here is:
Two of your five findings were fixed as part of the earlier post. Committed to the repo
Point 2 — done. Charter §12.2 now reads “unanimous written consent of all seated RAC members”. Your interim-Treasury-Signer example is the sharpest version of this we received: an appointed person, never elected, holding a veto over constitutional emergency repair. We used “the Delegates and RAC members” in §14 rather than “the RAC”, so an elected Delegate holding no RAC seat still gets legal notice.
Point 5 — done. The bullets are gone; Treasury Signers Rules §9 is now the sole authority. Your second-reading point — that “grounds outside this list” doesn’t say which list — was the part we’d missed, and the fix removes it.
Point 3 — doesn’t arise. OA §7.4: “The composition, candidacy rules, election mechanics, term, removal process… shall be governed by the Charter and any subordinate governance rules.” The procedure lives in Elections §10; amending it is a Governance Process proposal, not an Entrenched Provision amendment, so OA §12.2(d)(iii) never engages. Note §12.2(a)(vi) entrenches 7.1–7.3, not 7.4. The one case (d)(iii) covers — writing a removal rule into entrenched OA text — is guarded on the community’s behalf, not the RAC’s.
Point 1 — §12.1 opens “Notwithstanding the above,” before the text you quote. That’s the device resolving the conflict you identify. And we’d go the other way on the drafting fix: replacing “regardless of approval level” with the §12.2(c)/(d) route converts an absolute prohibition into an express permission at 20% and two-thirds. On §12.2(a)(xi) — which Charter designations carry OA-level entrenchment was a deliberate decision by legal counsel; the (viii) proviso is evidence of that design. Not reopening it.
Point 4 — our guide caused this. It implied Treasury Signers are elected. They aren’t: Treasury Signing is allocated by the RAC from among its seated members (P&V §4.5; Delegate Mandate §3). The guide is corrected. Two other premises: delegation isn’t disabled for these votes, it isn’t enabled for any vote yet; and Parameters §6B sets the Grade Quantile at three-fifths precisely so both mechanisms demand the same 60% of turnout — the scope argument survives, the threshold argument doesn’t. Fuller answer in the reply to the original post. The compounding claim depends on point 3, so it falls with it.
On timing — adding a sub-clause to an executed instrument under deadline isn’t free, and neither OA point here is one we’re acting on. Nothing in this batch reopens the OA.
I appreciate you for contributing but I still feel that this needs to be pointed out, in fairness:
This post, its announcement and all of the process began on the 31st August.
For a period meant to be of 7 days. All of it properly communicated and well known in advance, btw - you can see the RAC’s meeting minutes where it was first made know in the DAO website, and those were announced and shared in advancement of setting this discussion up.
Due to the unfortunate events that lead to our network being inoperative, we extended it, taking advantage of that misfortune to enable further discussion and contributions to be had - it ends today, 18 days after it started.
This was to have been completed and terminated 10 days ago. Your valuable contributions wouldn’t even exist if that had been the case, unless you had provided them at least 10 days before the date you did.
Still, it’s a positive outcome and we are grateful for it.
However, "Tight deadline", as you put it, does not apply by any measure.
I want, as a Transition RAC member, add the following to this, for a more detailed clarification:
Signing the document (whatever format it may have, as long as it’s a human readable one) also provides an additional layer of non-repudiation that doesn’t exist by any other means.
The website, the GitHub repo, all things online really, are much more open and available for being modified in unintended ways (be it accidental, intentionally harmful or ignorantly/naively though to be an improvement or innocuous to its purpose and content).
We intentionally designed a system that requires offline, detached, signing of a document with a capable and strong (by current standards and for the foreseeable temporal relevance of the process) digital certificate that is not available and cannot, within acceptable and reasonable risk boundaries, be counterfeited nor used by unauthorized third-parties or non-Transition RAC members, even if they have access to all else.
So, even in an event where the repository is modified, providing altered forms of a document, along with an also updated, valid, hash of this new version, the presence of a false seal or a broken one, or a complete absence of one, gives the reader a clear notice and confident indication that smtg might be wrong and warrants further scrutiny.
The use of the PDF format is meant to provide a simple and convenient way, mostly digitally universal by today’s standards, for the document to be downloaded, read and checked by anyone offline and/or at their convenience, without requiring access to the live repo or website where they reside.
Moreover, such a format readily provides a most convenient and very well supported way of checking the digital signature details and integrity that is of general use today, including for long term digital archiving, even legal purposes - the produced PDF documents are PDF-A compliant with only two minor remarks when strictly assessing for standard compliance, those being relative to fonts embedding and metadata strict encoding.
In sum, if you have a document that is signed by the Transition RAC this way and under these boundaries, we will answer for it, because we accept it to be authentic, integral and correct.
Otherwise, for a simple non-signed md file that we can’t guarantee that was not modified, if faced with any discrepancy for whatever reason, we cannot provide such a level of confidence and commitment.
Thanks for your clarifications. They clear up some stuff I missed when I was writing my suggestions.
On entrenchment: I guess this is where it shows that I’m a layman 
It looked like an oversight to me, but since it was deliberately done this way by the legal counsel, I trust that it’s correct like this.
Some comments on some of the stuff that was rejected:
Short TC
A tiebreaker/runoff vote is specifically where I don’t think a 1-day window would ever be suitable.
Of course the community gets plenty of notice but I think there will still be plenty cases where folks can’t make it during a specific 24-hour window, especially where weird timezones are involved.
Maybe we should raise the floor to 36 or 48 hours at least.
PDF vs Markdown — Hashing the .md gives integrity but no authenticity.
.md can be signed too, but I guess that would be harder to verify for non-technical folks. Might be something that can be discussed for future proposals.
Separate guides folder
Putting the guides in a separate folder doesn’t change any of the rules, but it would make it easier for humans to distinguish between policy and guide at a glance without AI assistance.
DRY / “Relationship to Other Policies”
I wasn’t aware these sections contain rules that aren’t already defined elsewhere. Maybe we can remove the remaining six “Relationship to Other Policies” sections though. Either way, it’s not a high priority issue.
Charter §13 heading (Definition of “Charter”)
Yes, the OA defines “Charter” to include the policies, which is OK.
The charter and governance library documents however use “Charter” in a way that refers to just the charter.pdf itself.
So there are two competing definitions of “Charter”, which is confusing and which is why I asked for this edit.
§4A.2A — ratification preceding formation is the design
So we are in a race against MIDAO? Or will formation wait for ratification?
Yes, “tight deadline” wasn’t fair, sorry for that. My contributions indeed wouldn’t have existed 10 days ago. I would probably have asked for an extension if the hack hadn’t happened.
The 18-day deadline was still tight for me because I have a bunch of other high priority stuff going on currently but that isn’t your fault.
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No, both processes can run in parallel and can occur in whatever order, as both documents (OA and Charter) have clear provisions regarding those possibilities.
In fact, they both are running right now and no clear certainty on witch will effectively end first.
Neither as to wait for the other, both become enacted as they complete. And if by chance there’s anything that we all might have missed that constitutes a contradiction or incompatibility , including Counsel, the OA, being the higher order for its legal standing wrt to the Law, supersedes the Charter in such cases and renders it void, regardless of what was ratified in the Charter (doesn’t solve us the issue of then, ofc, we may need to modify whatever was broken)
This was done intentionally, btw, as there would be too much uncertainty on both processes to provides with a clear timetable as to what would constitute the best way.
Also partially contributes to the reason why there is a Transition period and a Transition RAC and only the Permanent RAC’s election and seating will coincide and is dependent on the Charter’s Ratification.
OK, that’s reassuring. Looks like it was a good choice to do it this way. There is no way to tell which will finish first right now 
I will continue reviewing the policies and see if I find more issues, even if I can’t make the ratification deadline anymore.
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Hi again. And thank you for your reply.
I think we settle this now. The cost of increasing TC for Elections by 1 day is not high.
Short TC. You’re right, and our reasoning didn’t cover your case. The notice argument works for an election Temperature Check, which follows a 7–10 day Nomination & Discussion Window. It doesn’t work for a tie runoff: that opens after an election closes, among tied candidates, with no new nominations and no preceding window, at a 3% quorum. A 24-hour window there excludes voters by timezone alone. The floor is now ≥2 days (Parameters §3.1), applying to election TCs, multi-option Approval Voting polls and runoffs alike.
Charter §13. Also taken. You’re right that “Charter” carries two senses across the corpus, and the heading stated the wider one without the qualification the sentence beneath it adds. It now reads “Scope of ‘Charter’ in the Operating Agreement.” The paragraph is unchanged.
Guides folder. One correction to what we told you: we said it would break ratified file paths. It wouldn’t — the guides aren’t in the manifest and nothing ratified links to them. The real reason is narrower: it changes no rule, and we’re not reorganising files during a signing window. A fair thing to propose later.
Note to you when your read more into the detailed policies. I expect you to find things. Things that will need to be corrected at some time but not necessarily important to be changed by a proposal immediately. Unless it is high priority findings it will be added to the backlog for revisions.
Great!
Yes, I agree that we can fix any minor issues in one large proposal sometime later, including the Guides folder and any unnecessary “Relationship to Other Policies” sections.
Allright Folks
Time as come to close this.
Thank you all that contributed in a direct way in particular, as well as to anyone that may have done some work but didn’t end up writing anything into the discussion.
From this reply onwards, the discussion may continue - in fact, let’s keep using it as the placeholder for it - but whatever is added will not be taken into consideration to the revised versions of the Charter and Policies that will be put for for TC and Ratification in the next phases of this process.
I here by determine the Discussion phase to be over, as a decision taken by the Transition RAC regarding the Governance Framework Ratification.
I will be making a small edit in the top lines of the original post to state this as well.
Thank you and carry on!