Trigger warning: THis-like post coming up.
, see a TLDR on the bottom. Also, I do not claim to know it all, even though this post is written like I do.
There’s currently a consultation ongoing to decide on which token(s) should count for DAO membership. It is quite the controversial one, it seems.
It’s easy to argue for any of the options intuitively (as in, “this feels fair”), but I reckon we would benefit from going back to first principles and reason our way to the end, step by step.
So, where do we start?
Imo, the central question is “what is the goal of our DAO?”
If we know the answer to this question, we can answer the question of which group of people is most aligned with this goal - or in other words “who does our DAO represent?”
Our DAO’s goal
Intuitively, there are two possible answers here. Our DAO’s goal is to make:
- Radix successful
- “XRD price go up”
Now, while the first might be the more principled one - and the one I’m sure will be more in line with the DAO’s official purpose - it is a vague goal. How do we even quantify success?
Ironically, I would argue we largely do so through XRD’s price.
XRD’s price is not a perfect measure of Radix’s success, but it is by far the best objective proxy we have for it over the long term. Therefore, making Radix successful is closely tied to making XRD’s price go up.
Which group aligns with that goal?
So, whichever of these two goals you deem superior, the group that aligns most with it is everyone that wants XRD’s price to go up, especially over the long term.
Now, who wants XRD’s price to go up? Congratulations Sherlock - it’s people that own XRD.
So how should membership of our DAO be determined? Ownership of XRD.
Attentive readers would now interrupt and point out that I’m trying to trick them. Because, aren’t there people that want XRD’s price to go up, but don’t own XRD?
Yes, there certainly are. To include them would be the ultimate utopia. Still, I’m discarding them on the grounds that there is no objective way of quantifying how much they want XRD’s price to go up. There is no good way to proceed here without just ignoring this group.
That said, I do not mean to imply that this group is unimportant - only that it cannot be represented cleanly in a voting system without introducing subjectivity. I’m not opposed to allocating voting power to this group in the future. If we ever find a robust and objective way to accurately represent users that want XRD’s price to go up without having direct exposure to it, I think it could absolutely be useful to include them.
Are you finally going to tell me what tokens we should use to vote with?
Yes, actually.
If you’ve been paying attention, you’ll probably guess my ideal scenario would be to allocate voting power by XRD ownership, or more precisely, exposure to XRD price movement.
The best way to measure this would be to add up a user’s net XRD, LSUs, and LSULP. This of course includes any of these tokens locked up in DeFi (ask the tax man if you own these and have exposure to them price-wise, the answer is most certainly yes).
A little earlier we discarded utopia, but I’d call this an almost-utopia.
Why not only LSUs?
Now, I’ve seen some people argue that calculating voting power using LSU holdings only would be better, because it is better for the network if everyone would stake. This seems like a great idea, I agreed with it at first too.
Imo, that logic is faulty though.
First of all, one could argue that the premise “more XRD staked is better” is subjective, and therefore shouldn’t be used.
But secondly - and this is the real fallacy - it confuses:
- people aligned with our goal (people that have XRD exposure)
- with people actively contributing towards our goal (people staking XRD)
The former would be a democracy (which I assume we want), and the latter would be a meritocracy (which I assume we don’t want).
People don’t get a say in our DAO because they are contributing (staking). People get a say because they are aligned with the mission (having XRD exposure).
If the people aligned with the mission deem staking to be so important that stakers should be rewarded - which they already are, by the way - the proper way to do so would be to incentivize staking even more, e.g. via a proposal to increase staking rewards.
Back on topic, do we go for our almost-utopia then?
Anything with the word “utopia” in it makes some alarm bells go off. In this case rightfully so, I’m afraid.
Why?
Because sadly, I think for now our almost-utopia is not fully feasible.
It will be a major pain to also include all DeFi positions in XRD exposure calculations to determine voting power. Therefore, I’d argue - which I feel I’m often doing lately - for the pragmatic approach:
We count LSUs, XRD, and LSULP.
No other tokens for now.
Truthfully, my aim with this post is not to decide on exactly the degree of pragmatism we should adopt.
The aim is to agree on the premises underpinning my almost-utopia.
If we agree on those, we can try our best to get as close as possible to it, while staying in the realm of what is realistically possible.
TL;DR
- The key question to determine what token we should use for DAO membership is what is the DAO’s goal?.
- Whether you frame that goal as “making Radix successful” or “XRD price go up”, in practice XRD price is the best long-term objective proxy we have to measure our progress towards that goal.
- Therefore, the DAO should represent people aligned with XRD’s long-term price performance.
- The most objective way to measure that alignment is exposure to XRD price movement.
- In an ideal world, voting power would be based on net XRD exposure (XRD + LSUs + LSULP, including DeFi positions).
- Fully capturing all DeFi exposure is not yet feasible, so a pragmatic approximation is needed.
- For now, the closest workable approach is to count XRD, LSUs, and LSULP only.
- As an example: using only LSUs would shift the DAO from a democracy (alignment-based) to a meritocracy (contribution-based), which is not desirable.