Answers to Piers - Grants Funding - Chats With AI

Here is an extended AI exchange that started with a summary of the responses to Piers’s question in TG Main, 4 June 2024. Telegram: Contact @radix_dlt
“Hey ya’ll interested to know what kind of things you guys are enjoying in DeFi at the moment? What is your favourite DeFi protocol and why (doesn’t have to be on Radix)?
What kind of things would you want to see funded by the Grants program?”

Let’s get serious about this.

I have said that I think the complexity of the type and category landscape can be reduced to further manageable abstractions using Category Theory and that there is a reason to do this.

The point of abstraction is to find generally applicable terms so that where those terms can be applied is not restricted to one set of circumstances.

There are two further reasons to map Scrypto into Category Theory.

  1. Pragmatically, it forms the basis for proof of a program’s soundness.
  2. Mathematics is known and accepted in a way that a specialised programming language is not, so this is political, as it broadens access and appeal, as well as, again, pragmatic by inviting a wider knowledgable audience to pay attention to what is being worked on.

Here is a not fully worked example.
Let’s identify the high-level Category Theoretic concepts in the Scrypto codebase, rephrased in terms of category theory.

1. Composition

Composition in Category Theory refers to the ability to combine two morphisms (arrows) to form a third. In Rust, this can often be seen in function chaining or method calls.

Example: In, the Blueprint struct provides methods like call_function and call_function_raw which chain multiple operations together to interact with the Scrypto virtual machine.

We can see that this could be modelled mathematically or, in maths near equivalent, in Haskell.
Haskell is mentioned because much of this work has already been done in that language.

Let me be clear: this is not about rewriting code or preferring another programming language.
It is about providing well-known high-level terms that can be extended in their own right and worked into proofs, as well as mapping both ways into Scrypto.
I would expect this modelling to allow exploring extreme scenarios through simulation.
Being able to do so would also add to Radix’s credibility.
For example, if I find a use case where success would mean low-cost, high-frequency transactions, modelling the various outcomes allowing for price movement and the expense of market penetration would be invaluable.

Radix may gain traction in other ways, such as becoming essential to aspects of people’s lives and providing security.
This would require a lot of market knowledge, but it could be projects that Universities would take up.

For instance there is a problem with Blue Badge theft in London. Amazon sell Badge Protect, but is that the only or best approach?
There must be other examples, but solid investigation takes time.

Now, honing down to social media, it is possible to envisage a mechanism installed on the mobile phone, a very restricted form of the wallet, which would monitor the user’s activity so that they cannot purchase knives online or send photos to random people eliciting them. Here, of course, I’m talking about the security parents are entitled to give their children.
These are just ideas; they could be thought through and applied elsewhere.
The point is that these sorts of ideas would give Radix a good reputation.

I notice I am consistent.
See this.

As promised, here is more AI-inspired content.
Also found on Twitter here

Let’s start this series of explorations with Dan and Toly’s posts here:-…

Also found on Reddit here:-

I asked AI some questions about the linked article, and here is the synopsis, but it is incorrect! Here is an AI synopsis of Dan’s article, followed by some Q&As.

  1. Some other key factors that can contribute to a blockchain network’s long-term security include:
  • Decentralization
    The more decentralized the network is in terms of validator participation across different entities and geographic regions, the harder it is for an attacker to compromise. - Incentive design - Well-designed economic incentives through mechanisms like staking rewards and slashing penalties that align the long-term interests of validators with network security.

  • Flexibility and upgrades
    The ability to upgrade consensus protocols and make changes to address new threats or issues over time as technologies evolve. Upgrades need to be backward compatible. - Resilience planning - Anticipating potential threats and risks through simulation of attacks and development of response and recovery plans to withstand attacks and minimize impact. - Diversity of validator types - Involving different types of validators like individuals, institutions and cloud/decentralized options to avoid compromising all validators of one type.

  • Network monitoring
    Constant monitoring of the network for anomalies, forensic analysis of past issues, and red team exercises to identify weak points and improve defenses proactively. - Multi-layered defenses - Incorporating multiple independent layers of security like cryptoeconomic incentives, operational practices, technical safeguards etc. rather than relying on a single point of failure.

  • Ongoing research
    Continued research on consensus algorithms, cryptographic techniques and socioeconomic factors to stay ahead of the evolving threat landscape with more robust solutions over time.


I am asking this question again as the previous answer was not correct. Pay attention to the material provided below. Here is the question. What points of view does toly (Anatoly Yakovenko, the founder of Solana) express (as quoted from X)? If his views are incorrect, what mistakes is he making? Below is the first quote from Anatoly Yakovenko deliniated begining and ending with three dashes and with some leading and one line of following context. — So, let me tell you why Anatoly’s arguments are wrong and why such a weak understanding of how these systems work will one day make Solana a “weak” network with compromised security. toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 5 Replying to


Their node doesn’t accept the quorum’s confirmation unless it sees all the blocks. It halts. 1. The Honest Majority Assumption — The following are further quotes, after the three dashes, each one from Anatoly Yakovenko begins


and ends Replying to


. There is then some quoted following text before the three dashes that indicate the end of the quoted segment. — But Anatoly seems to have a different understanding about this. toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 5 Replying to


Even if adversary controls 100% of the stake honest full node operators need to be able to reject invalid state transitions. What’s the minimum setup necessary to do that? toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 5 Replying to


No. Circle has to see all the blocks and execute them locally. That’s what it means to run a full node. Get all the possible blocks and check that the network didn’t f’ it up. So let me debunk this BS! — Here are some further quotes again given within three dashes to deliniate them from the comments I am making here. — Any entity that runs multiple full nodes at this point cannot prevent a double spend attack, which my friend here fails to understand. toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 5 Replying to


No. Circle has to see all the blocks and execute them locally. That’s what it means to run a full node. Get all the possible blocks and check that the network didn’t f’ it up. So let me go a bit deeper. — A further quote:- ___ This is a nuclear attack level scenario for a network. A monolithic blockchain like Solana or sharded networks like Near, MultiversX, or Radix will be equally susceptible to ending up in such a situation if there is no longer an honest majority participating in the network. Distributed ledger networks are supposed to be built with pillars that fortify the system from becoming vulnerable to such an attack. That’s why factors like economic /socio-economic security matter. toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 7 Replying to


The industry acceptable way to deal with honest majority assumptions is to slap “inherits economic security” bandaid on it. This is where I strongly disagree with Anatoly’s take on factors like economic security. — The final quote from the piece:- — The Socio-Economic Cost of “Zero-Cost Attacks”? This is where pure technologists like Anatoly fail to understand the socio-economic nature of these systems. toly :us:| bip-420


· Jun 7 Replying to


Economic security is a cost to honest participants to get enough stake to prevent attacks. But dishonest participants can get it for free. A management change at a CEX or stake aggregator will change the behavior of the nodes they operate. Security is measured by the lowest Show more The argument that attackers could acquire tokens for free is flawed. Here the concept of economic security can be extended to the idea of “socio-economic” security. —

3/n Now, here is the reply. Based on the quotes provided: - Anatoly Yakovenko expresses the view that for a node to be considered “full”, it needs to see and validate all blocks locally rather than relying on validator signatures (“No. Circle has to see all the blocks and execute them locally. That’s what it means to run a full node.”). - He argues that nodes need to be able to reject invalid state transitions even if an adversary controls 100% of the stake (“Even if adversary controls 100% of the stake honest full node operators need to be able to reject invalid state transitions.”). - He disagrees with the concept of “economic security”, arguing that it is just a “bandaid” and that dishonest participants can acquire stakes freely without costs (“The industry acceptable way to deal with honest majority assumptions is to slap “inherits economic security” bandaid on it.”). - He claims security is measured by what an attacker can do at the lowest cost, ignoring socio-economic deterrents (“Security is measured by the lowest”). These views expressed by Anatoly Yakovenko are mistaken as they: - Fail to understand the honest majority assumption and how nodes ultimately rely on validator signatures for consistency. - Overstate the capability of nodes to independently validate without trusting validators. - Downplay the importance of economic incentives in aligning stakeholder interests with the network’s security. - Fail to acknowledge socio-economic factors like reputation that compound costs and make attacks practically irrational beyond direct expenses. So in summary, Yakovenko makes the mistake of an incomplete conceptual model of blockchain security that ignores or misunderstands key economic and socio-technical facets of how these systems are designed to remain secure.

8:59 PM · Jun 15, 2024

This is the actual AI Summary:-

I’m hypnotised by the AI obviously.

But there is a lot to digest of great importance here.

Here is a summary of the article in English:


The article argues that Solana founder Anatoly Yakovenko has a flawed understanding of key security concepts in distributed ledger networks, which could compromise Solana’s security if not addressed. It aims to debunk Yakovenko’s perspectives and explain why economic and socio-economic security are important considerations in system design.

Key Points

More similar discussions to come.
And, btw I would far prefer to keep the discussion here.
This is far and away the best interface for edits and getting the text right.

It is odd that the popular mediums of X and Reddit are horrific to manage.